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Simeon Mitropolitski is a Canadian analyst, of Bulgarian origin, and a former syndicated columnist with the Bulgarian News Agency (BTA). He is the author of several hundred articles dealing with hot political and economic topics, both national and international.

He was part of the first group of Bulgarian intellectuals and students that began the opposition movement that finally put an end to the communist regime in this country in 1989, and in 1996-1997 participated in international observation teams during the elections in several Balkan countries - Romania, Albania and Bulgaria.

In 2002 Simeon and his family moved from Bulgaria to Canada where they live now in Montreal, province of Quebec. Simeon is a Master of Political Science from McGill University and a B.A. of Political Science and History.

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• Ukraine 2002
  
• Ukraine 2004
  
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• Ukraine 2007
  
• Ukraine 2007, 2
  
• Ukraine 2008
  

10 years ago the European Union hasn't still developed a clear idea of whether and when it should expend eastward. It wasn't until after 1995-1996 that the West realized that the large area between its eastern frontiers and Russia must be attracted in both political and economic way in order to put an end to the endless conflicts and the artificial division of the continent. The countries that only waited for this signals like Poland, Hungary and Estonia, just to mention few, were the first to grasp for this new opportunity. Other countries like Bulgaria until into the second half of the 1990's still wanted to be a middle ground between the West and the East until the economic realities showed them that such an approach was completely out of touch with the modern realities. Belarus made a complete turnaround and returned to the Russian orbit where it was moderately compensated with cheaper oil and gas. Today Ukraine remains the only one that still hasn't decided clearly what should be its main foreign priority.

As a mater of fact, such indecisiveness hides a development of this country toward Russia. Close observation of its economic development shows how solidly it's linked with the much larger economy on the Northeast. During most of the 1990's the Ukrainian GDP has decreased following the Russian trends despite the strong Polish economic boom. Since 1999 the trends have been reversed due to the higher energy prices, and their weight on the Russian exports. There isn't a doubt that Ukraine still follows the economic trends of Russia and not of the Central Europe.

In political plan Kiev still has to play attention to complex factors that don't allow the country to make a clear choice between the West and Russia. Ukraine is a home of millions Russians that won't be happy to see themselves living in a country colliding with the Russian interests. On the other hand, millions of Catholics won't be happy to see themselves again under Moscow domination. The result is to stay in between, showing clearly no particular attachment either to the West or to Russia and leaving the economy to develop following the Russian mainstream.

Such approach was possible in the 1990's when both Russia and the West didn't have clear visions and/or resources to move toward their peripheries. 2004 will signal the incorporation of most countries of Central and Eastern Europe into the European Union. Some of the remaining states from the Balkans will join the Union in the years to come. The Ukraine will remain the last territory falling clearly in neither of the camps. Can this continue for long?

Politicians in Kiev firmly believe in such option. They hope they won't be forced to make clear decisions about the foreign orientation of the country. The European Union is ready to recognize Ukraine as its eastern neighbor in Europe and to put a halt of its eastward expansion. Doing this, Brussels will kill at least 3 birds:

• It won't allow the Russian to blame the West of meddling with a zone that isn't entirely Western in cultural and political terms;
• It will consolidate the present expansion and push reforms in other sensitive dimensions;
• It won't allow millions of poor Ukrainians to legally migrate westward; Unfortunately the West as well as the Ukrainian government will have to change their status quo approaches because the third factor in the equilibrium, Russia, won't accept it as far as the history can be used as a teacher. To accept the hypothesis that Russia won't try to put Ukraine again under tighter control will mean to accept that Russia is no longer an imperial power, which contradicts main premises of its national identity. The border disputes around the Crimea peninsula are only the first step of measuring the forces in the future political conflict between Moscow and Kiev. Scenarios of this conflict, which may be peaceful in the means adopted by the both sides, are at least four:
• Russia will increase the pressure on Ukraine, Kiev will appeal for Western assistance, the West will formally recognize Ukraine as a Russian sphere of influence as did regarding Hungary in 1956 or Czechoslovakia in 1968. Without western help, Kiev will find more appropriate to accommodate to the Russian interests, remaining formally an independent country. Such scenario seems improbable, it will recreate the situation during the Cold War, a situation that will delay the ultimate solution;
• The West (EU, NATO) will try to deal directly with Russia, dividing Ukraine on two spheres of influence. The country may be split on two or three regions, the western under EU and NATO domination and the eastern under Russian. Another option is that the country may still remain one and formerly neutral like Switzerland after 1815 with the Western and Russian interests represented at certain degree in the governing bodies. This scenario is also improbable because the West won't accept acting according to the spheres of influence premises;
• The West will help Ukraine politically and militarily (if necessary). The Russia will be pushed back, but in order not to repeat this tension, the West will incorporate Ukraine as did with the Central and Eastern Europe. Such Western reaction is more than likely but we shouldn't expect that Russia will engage in political adventure without assuring that West will stay away from its path;
• Russia will wait until the West is badly divided (as was the case in 2003) in order to get Ukraine with minimum efforts. In this case the speed of operation will determine its success.

Ukraine country profile:

• Area: 603,700 sq km
• Population: 48,055,439 (July 2003 est.)
• Life expectancy at birth: 66.5 years
• Main ethnic groups: Ukrainian 77.8%, Russian 17.3%
• Religions: 3 Orthodox groups (Moscow Patriarchate, Kiev Patriarchate, Autocephalous), Ukrainian Catholic (Uniate), Protestant, Jewish.
• Languages: Ukrainian, Russian, Romanian, Polish, Hungarian.
• GDP per capita: purchasing power parity $4,500 (2002 est.)
• Population below poverty line: 29% (2001 est.)
• Main trading partners: Russia, Germany, Italy.
• Internet users: 750,000 (2001)

(Source: CIA - The World Factbook 2003)

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See also the directory of companies providing real estate services in, and general real estate information of Ukraine.