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Simeon Mitropolitski is a Canadian analyst, of Bulgarian origin, and a former syndicated columnist with the Bulgarian News Agency (BTA). He is the author of several hundred articles dealing with hot political and economic topics, both national and international.
He was part of the first group of Bulgarian intellectuals and students that began the opposition movement that finally put an end to the communist regime in this country in 1989, and in 1996-1997 participated in international observation teams during the elections in several Balkan countries - Romania, Albania and Bulgaria.
In 2002 Simeon and his family moved from Bulgaria to Canada where they live now in Montreal, province of Quebec. Simeon is a Master of Political Science from McGill University and a B.A. of Political Science and History.
Global Real Estate Project
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Russia: Money above all
Many know about the Russian riddle, described by Churchill, which needs the key of national interest in order to be unlocked. This interest, however, doesn't explain anything in particular. Big countries, either in size or in population, aren't authoritarian by definition. To look at Russia as a nation forever trapped in a vicious circle of tyranny barely stands the test of facts; it was the Soviet Union, after all, that triggered the decomposition of the communism in the late 1980s. So why Russia went the 'wrong' way, considering the liberal democracy as the highway of modern political development? One way of looking to the Russian exceptionality is to see it as some natural development of the authoritarian ideas throughout the history. Finding undemocratic political patterns in medieval times, however, doesn't explain anything because liberal democracy is precisely a modern phenomenon, meaning most countries in medieval times, including most western democracies were undemocratic at that time. Looking at the constitutional arrangement in post-communist Russia is helpful, to some degree; the strong presidential institution, however, doesn't always lead to dictatorship in the post-communist context. Russia in its authoritarian regime isn't personal dictatorship; the power of Putin isn't a serious match to that of Stalin or Hitler. At the limits, he can order someone to be arrested; it's hard to imagine that Putin can send millions into concentration or extermination camps. The Russian state was trapped by some big economic interests by the mid-1990s, and following that time, each consecutive Russian government makes a top priority defending these interests, and when necessary, destroying all other interests that collide with the ruling financial and industrial oligarchy. The big difference between Russia and other countries of similar size, is that the ruling elite has decided (for unknown reasons) to stick together, by redistributing among themselves some of the economic benefits of their unity, thus eliminating any need of appealing to the population in times of election. It's as if in the United States the two big parties were one and the same party; the big business then will stop building large coalitions with social groups of different kind and size, environmentalists, feminists, church-goers, lonely parents, ethnic and racial minorities. The liberal democracy as we know it isn't possible without a fundamental split within the business elite, or between this elite and the labor movement, or both. In Russia so far, this split is missing, which partly explains why there is one 'party of power', and not several parties that compete for the people's votes. This explanation, however, doesn't answer the question what makes Russia unique, which makes possible the elite to unite and to stick together? The Russian economy is running on exporting natural resources, oil, gas, and all sorts of metals. This economy is capital intensive, and the labor is generally unskilled. Without a strong industrial lobby of finished goods, Russia will never have a split in the interests of the business elite; basically, all that they want is to export as much resources as possible, at the highest price possible. The existence of strong industrial lobby for finished goods would have created a dilemma; industrialists, on the contrary, want the large part of the resources to stay at home, and to be available at the lowest price possible. To compete on the world markets, they need educated labor. Talking to the labor, the capital-intensive model in Russia precludes organized labor movement; the dispersed oil and gas fields beyond the polar circle aren't the best places to ask for wage increases or to threaten with strikes. Natural resources occupy few workers, and they are paid very well by the Russian standards; so their interests go with their masters, not with the Russian poor. So no business split, and no organized counter elite around the unions. Russia is an economic and financial oligarchy rather than personal dictatorship. The only obstacle for the authoritarianism 'Russian way' was the international public opinion, i.e. the opinion of some western governments. With the high oil prices, Russia is now financially independent from the West. With the post 9/11 wars, the attention of the West has shifted toward other matters. As far as Russia remains calm and doesn't threaten directly Eastern Europe, the West can pretend that nothing serious is going on in Moscow. Can Russia move away from its current course? It's possible after the last drop of oil in Siberia, or when the barrel of oil falls below $20, or when some foreign threat from the East makes the West again a preferable partner. The future is an open system; the undemocratic regime in Moscow will last for some time, but nothing prevents new political openings, as surprising as those of the late 1980s.
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