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Simeon Mitropolitski is a Canadian analyst, of Bulgarian origin, and a former syndicated columnist with the Bulgarian News Agency (BTA). He is the author of several hundred articles dealing with hot political and economic topics, both national and international.
He was part of the first group of Bulgarian intellectuals and students that began the opposition movement that finally put an end to the communist regime in this country in 1989, and in 1996-1997 participated in international observation teams during the elections in several Balkan countries - Romania, Albania and Bulgaria.
In 2002 Simeon and his family moved from Bulgaria to Canada where they live now in Montreal, province of Quebec. Simeon is a Master of Political Science from McGill University and a B.A. of Political Science and History.
Global Real Estate Project
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Georgia: "Rose revolutions" 3 and 4 still aheadWhen, in November 2003, the former Georgian president Eduard Shevardnadze stepped down under heavy popular and concealed foreign pressures, for a moment it seemed that this Caucasian country might go a different political and social path, away from crony capitalism and unimaginable corruption that tarnished its brief period of post-soviet independence. What then was called "Rose revolution" replaced the strongest person and its clan entourage on the top without moving the country more toward West. Even after the new big boss Mikhail Saakashvili succeeded in ousting the strongman of Adzharia in May 2004 his tasks remain daunting, to put under control two more provinces with non-Georgian ethnic majority, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The task is even more challenging because these two are supported politically by Russia, the former imperial master in the region. Unlike his predecessor Shevardnadze, Saakashvili is more dependent on the ultra nationalistic circles in Georgia. This puts the small republic on the colliding course with Russia. On the other hand, the United States that support politically Tbilisi, are placed in a delicate situation, trying both to support the national aspirations of Georgians and not to irritate Moscow, a much needed ally on so many other fronts. November 2003 changed Georgia, although the changes were not what usually were portrayed in the media controlled by the new revolutionary government. The real change wasn't that the power passed from the corrupted regime to the people. This myth was reproduced time and again in order to keep the western financial and military help running in. The real change was that diplomatic approaches in dealing with the national problems in Georgia, established by Eduard Shevardnadze more than 10 year ago were replaced by much more radical and non-compromised approaches. The force took over diplomacy. It did well in the first two episodes of the "Rose revolution", forcing Shevardnadze to resign in 2003 and forcing Adzharian strongman Aslan Abashidze to follow his example earlier this year. What was done well twice was tried again in South Ossetia with no conclusive results so far. Moscow that looked away when Shevardnadze and Abashidze were ousted this time decided to show teeth and remind Tbilisi who's the former master in the region. Russia has particular reasons to worry about what's happening around its southern border. Georgia and Chechnya are neighbors. Around Chechnya there are several other Russian autonomous republics with no clear allegiance toward Moscow. An all-out war in the Caucasus can cause big trouble on the southern Russian flank with no obvious outcome. Another reason why Moscow wants this region be kept calm is the importance it plays for the economic and social future of Russia. In fact the Southern Russia is the only federal region to have gained population during the last 15 years (+11%). Russian North and Siberia are losing population; the central Russia around Moscow shows stagnation. Who will control this region with its growing human resources is a matter of highest priority in Moscow. That's why Georgia won't be allowed to reunite with its two remaining breakaway provinces without giving Russia certain guarantees about the peace along the southern Russian borders. Such guarantees may include Georgia into the Russian area of influence and block most energy projects from Central Asia and Azerbaijan to Europe bypassing Russia.
 Russian Northern Caucasus
Georgia Country profile:
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